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Assessment workflow

This page describes how to complete a defensible GTSAF assessment from preparation through final assurance reporting.

Confirm that:

  • The correct workspace is open.
  • The AI system is registered.
  • The intake record describes the current use case and architecture.
  • The system owner and assessment owner are identified.
  • The linked System Record and Intake contain complete, conflict-free routing facts.
  • ACRS has been reviewed where its additional depth is material to the assessment.
  • The intended assessment boundary is documented.
  • The assessment is in edit mode and not locked.
  • The assessor has access to the required evidence, testing and findings modules.

Record:

  • The named AI system and system reference.
  • Business purpose and intended use.
  • Users and affected people.
  • Deployment model.
  • Models and providers.
  • Data categories and sources.
  • Interfaces, APIs and integrations.
  • RAG, prompts, context stores and retrieval sources.
  • Agentic tools, memory and delegated actions.
  • Human decision points.
  • Environments in scope.
  • Jurisdictions and regulatory roles.
  • Suppliers and shared-responsibility boundaries.
  • Known exclusions.

Avoid boundaries such as “the AI platform” without naming the actual components and operating relationships.

Choose:

  • All GTSAF controls
  • AI system: authoritative intake route complete

For a formal multi-system assessment, select the named system. ACRS confirmation is not required to determine factual applicability; where ACRS is unavailable, the screen identifies that no confirmed ACRS depth overlay is being used.

Review:

  • Applicable-control count.
  • Baseline, Triggered and Enhanced depth counts.
  • Depth-weighted workload and assurance intensity.
  • Factual scope drivers and their overlap warning.
  • Applicability-pending controls.
  • Out-of-scope controls.
  • The reason shown for each control’s applicability.

Confirm that:

Baseline + Triggered + Enhanced = Applicable controls

and:

Applicable controls + Applicability pending + Out of scope = 358

Do not interpret the largest applicable-control count as the highest-risk system. Applicable count measures breadth; workload and assurance intensity explain required rigour. If professional judgement identifies an additional relevant control, include and assess it without changing the underlying Intake merely to obtain a preferred count.

GTSAF is organised A to Q. A practical assessment sequence is:

  1. A-C: governance, legal and intake.
  2. D-G: data and model engineering.
  3. H-I: prompt, retrieval, inference and runtime.
  4. J-L: identity, agentic action and supply chain.
  5. M-N: monitoring, oversight and impact.
  6. O-Q: resilience, assurance and infrastructure.

This order establishes governance and system facts before detailed technical testing.

For each control, review:

  • Control statement.
  • Objective.
  • Risk addressed.
  • Applicability explanation.
  • Criticality.
  • Gate status.
  • Implementation guidance.
  • Required evidence.
  • Test procedure.
  • Control owner.
  • Evidence owner.
  • Cross-framework mappings.
  • Role-specific guidance.

Do not assess from the short title alone.

Select Yes only when the requirement is met in the selected scope.

A Yes answer should be accompanied by:

  • Clear implementation narrative.
  • Named responsibility.
  • Relevant evidence.
  • Testing where operating effectiveness matters.

Yes is an assessor claim, not proof by itself.

Select No when the requirement is absent, incomplete or ineffective.

Then:

  • Explain the precise deficiency.
  • Identify the risk or consequence.
  • Link or raise a finding.
  • Record compensating controls.
  • Assign remediation.
  • Decide whether deployment restrictions or escalation are needed.

No creates a Gap. On a Gate control it creates a Gate fail.

Select N/A only where the requirement genuinely does not apply to the selected boundary.

Complete:

  • Detailed rationale.
  • Decision category.
  • Decision owner.
  • Independent approver.
  • Approval date.
  • Review date or reassessment trigger.
  • Evidence references.
  • Compensating controls or boundary safeguards.

Until the governance fields are complete, the N/A is not honoured.

Step 6: assign shared-responsibility ownership

Section titled “Step 6: assign shared-responsibility ownership”

Choose the party that actually operates or assures the requirement:

  • MP
  • OSP
  • AP
  • AIC
  • CSP
  • Shared
  • ND

For Shared:

  • Identify which party performs each activity.
  • Identify which party remains accountable.
  • Link contractual or architectural evidence.
  • Explain how gaps and incidents are escalated across the boundary.

Resolve ND before sign-off.

The implementation narrative should state:

  • What is implemented.
  • Where it is implemented.
  • Who operates it.
  • Which systems or environments it covers.
  • How often it operates.
  • How exceptions are handled.
  • How changes are approved.
  • Which evidence demonstrates operation.
  • What the customer or another provider must do.
  • Known limitations.

Avoid statements such as:

  • “Industry best practice is followed.”
  • “The vendor handles this.”
  • “Security is enabled.”
  • “Compliant.”

Those statements are not testable without further detail.

Use the control’s Required evidence advisory as the starting checklist.

For each artefact:

  • Link it to the correct control.
  • Link it to the correct system or intake.
  • Record owner and date.
  • Review its relevance, sufficiency and currency.
  • Record the review status.
  • Record evidence quality.
  • Reject generic or stale material.

Narrative does not become verified evidence through keyword matching.

Use the control-specific test procedure to design a bounded test.

Record:

  • Test objective.
  • Test steps.
  • Population and sample.
  • Expected result.
  • Pass criteria.
  • Safety limits.
  • Test date.
  • Tester.
  • Result.
  • Exceptions.
  • Retest date.

Do not conduct destructive production tests without explicit authorisation.

Raise a finding when:

  • A question is No.
  • A Gate fails.
  • Evidence is rejected or materially insufficient.
  • A test fails or produces an exception.
  • Ownership is unresolved.
  • The implementation differs from policy or contract.
  • The control cannot be demonstrated in operation.
  • A Critical control lacks required test coverage.

A useful finding contains:

  • Clear title.
  • Affected control and system.
  • Condition observed.
  • Expected requirement.
  • Evidence.
  • Root cause.
  • Risk consequence.
  • Severity.
  • Recommendation.
  • Owner.
  • Target date.
  • Status.

Complete the structured conclusion:

  • Design effectiveness.
  • Implementation effectiveness.
  • Operating effectiveness.
  • Evidence conclusion.
  • Residual risk.
  • Assessor conclusion.
  • Monitoring cadence.
  • Reassessment triggers.
  • Reviewer.
  • Review date.

The conclusion should identify:

  • What was reviewed.
  • What was tested.
  • What could not be verified.
  • Open exceptions.
  • Compensating controls.
  • The basis for residual risk.
  • The conditions under which the conclusion expires.

Review:

  • Conformance.
  • Verified evidence.
  • Narrative sufficiency.
  • Ownership clarity.
  • Audit readiness.
  • Assurance percentage.
  • Assurance score.
  • Gate failures.
  • Critical-control evidence and tests.
  • Open findings.

Do not use the headline score without reading the underlying gaps and caps.

AI Assist can:

  • Summarise the current validated scope.
  • Identify evidence and testing gaps.
  • Suggest bounded test procedures.
  • Draft effectiveness and residual-risk reasoning.
  • Identify monitoring and reassessment needs.

The assessor must:

  • Confirm the displayed system scope.
  • Check every claimed verified fact.
  • Reject invented or unsupported conclusions.
  • Decide whether to apply suggestions.
  • Retain human accountability.

Before sign-off, ask:

  • Is the correct system selected?
  • Is the authoritative Intake route complete and current?
  • Has ACRS been reviewed where it changes required assurance depth?
  • Do the scope and depth totals reconcile?
  • Can the factual scope drivers be explained?
  • Are all Mandatory, Triggered and Enhanced controls addressed?
  • Are Critical and Gate controls prioritised?
  • Are N/A decisions independently approved?
  • Are Yes answers supported by linked evidence?
  • Are Critical controls tested?
  • Are failed tests and rejected evidence reflected in the conclusion?
  • Are all findings linked and owned?
  • Does residual risk reflect open exceptions?
  • Are monitoring and reassessment triggers specific?
  • Does the report use the correct system bucket?

Once reviewed:

  • Lock the assessment according to your governance process.
  • Generate the appropriate system or workspace report.
  • Obtain formal review or approval.
  • Record risk acceptance separately where required.
  • Schedule the next review.

Locking prevents assessment changes and AI suggestions from being applied without reopening the governed workflow.

Reassess after:

  • A new model or major model version.
  • New training data or a changed retrieval corpus.
  • A supplier or hosting change.
  • New tools, plugins, memory or autonomy.
  • Expanded privileges or system access.
  • New personal or sensitive data.
  • A move into a new jurisdiction.
  • A serious incident, complaint or control failure.
  • A material change in intended use.
  • A failed control test.
  • A regulatory or contractual change.
  • Expiry of a N/A decision or evidence item.

A defensible sign-off should include:

  • System and scope.
  • Assessment date.
  • Assessor and reviewer.
  • Applicable control population.
  • Gate failures.
  • Critical control status.
  • Evidence and testing summary.
  • Open findings.
  • Residual risk.
  • Deployment or use restrictions.
  • Monitoring cadence.
  • Reassessment triggers.
  • Approval decision.